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Abstract. Personas are useful for obtaining an empirically grounded
understanding of a secure system’s user population, its contexts of use,
and possible vulnerabilities and threats endangering it. Often, however,
personas need to be partly derived from assumptions; these may be em-
bedded in a variety of different representations. Assumption Personas
have been proposed as boundary objects for articulating assumptions
about a user population, but no methods or tools currently exist for
developing and refining these within the context of secure and usable
design. This paper presents an approach for developing and refining as-
sumption personas before and during the design of secure systems. We
present a model for structuring the contribution of assumptions to as-
sumption personas, together with a process for developing assumption
personas founded on this model. We also present some preliminary re-
sults based on an application of this approach in a recent case study.
1 Introduction
Personas are useful for obtaining a grounded understanding of a system’s con-
texts of use, and communicating that understanding within a design team. Re-
cent work on applying personas to help elicit and specify secure system require-
ments found that the data and analysis from which personas are derived also
help identify threats and vulnerabilities [10]. Although adherents of personas ar-
gue that these should be primarily derived from real-world observations [7, 14],
the necessary resources for eliciting and analysing such data may not always be
available. In these cases, it is necessary to rely on second-hand data about users
and their contexts, much of which might be derived from assumptions.
Many usability professionals are familiar with analysing assumption-based
usage data, but this may not be the case for software engineers. Engineers are
usually employed for their technical expertise and domain knowledge; we cannot
reasonably expect them to have a working knowledge of usability design tech-
niques as well. They do, however, have tacit knowledge of the problem domain
and a sensitivity to the values at play within its contexts of use. The challenge
is to not only trace assumptions made about personas to their source, but to
explicate the claims these assumptions represent. By doing so, we also explicate
tacit knowledge about users and their contexts. Like data directly elicited from
real-world observations, this data also suggests hitherto unknown threats and
vulnerabilities related to a system.
Techniques from Design Rationale research are useful for tracking the refine-
ment of assumptions to architectural components and software. Such techniques
may also be useful for tracking the same assumptions to less refined concepts
used in security analysis. Security design has the same needs for discharging
potential ambiguity grounded in assumptions; these may be sources of attack
vectors if the vulnerabilities they expose are exploited. In this paper, we present
an approach for developing assumption personas for secure system design, and
describe how this approach can be embedded into an existing design process and
associated tool-support. In section 2, we briefly introduce personas and describe
the related work motivating our approach. In section 3 we present an overview
of our approach, and in section 4 we report on some preliminary findings which
arose when applying this approach in a recent case-study.
2 Related work
2.1 Personas and Assumption Personas
Personas are behavioural specifications of archetypical users. These were intro-
duced by Cooper [6] to deal with programmer biases arising from the word user.
These biases lead to programmers bending and stretching assumptions about
users to meet their own expectations; Cooper called this phenomena designing
for the elastic user. Personas are now a mainstay in User-Centered Design, with
articles, book-chapters, and even a book [14] devoted to developing and applying
them in practice. Personas have also been applied to Requirements Engineering,
an area of intersection between HCI and Software Engineering [4].
Accepting that data-driven personas are an ideal rather than a norm, Pruitt
& Adlin [14] proposed Assumption Personas: persona sketches created to ar-
ticulate existing assumptions about an organisation’s user population. These
personas are grounded in assumptions contributors hold about users, and the
context of investigation. These assumptions may be derived from interpreted
or mis-interpreted experiences, and coloured by individual and organisational
values. Assumption Personas help people see the value of personas in design,
and how different assumptions shape them. As a result, when exposed, they can
guide subsequent analysis or data collection for data-driven personas.
Personas are not, however, without their critics. Chapman & Milham argue
that, as fictional archetypes, personas are difficult to verify as there is no way to
falsify them [5]. They further argue that questions remain about how personas
should be reconciled with other information, understanding what data underpins
their characteristics, and what happens when different interpretations are made
from the same persona.
2.2 Integrating Personas with Secure Software Engineering
Chapman and Milham’s criticism about the stand-alone nature of personas can
be addressed by integrating them into the software engineering process. This
has been the subject of our recent work on the IRIS (Integrating Requirements
and Information Security) framework, which integrates usability into the design
of secure software systems [8]. As part of this work, a meta-model for usable
secure requirements engineering was devised, which integrates the persona with
other concepts in usability, security, and software engineering. From this model,
we have developed CAIRIS (Computer Aided Integration of Requirements and
Information Security): a tool for managing information about personas and other
design elements, and evaluating the effect to security and usability of different
design decisions [1]. CAIRIS manages requirements, task, and risk data, and
automatically generates different types of visual model to represent the ongoing
analysis. We demonstrate this approach in [9] by illustrating how categorical
information about a task performed by a pre-defined persona is associated with
the results of risk analysis, and how the usability of this task can be visually
represented before and after a related risk is mitigated.
In [10], we presented a process for developing personas for secure systems;
this is based on collecting and analysing empirical data from qualitative and con-
textual interviews. The personas derived from analysing this data were validated
and further refined in participatory requirements and risk analysis workshops.
We also found that empirical data used to derive personas could be re-used for
other analysis.
Even though personas may be grounded in empirical data, the quandary
about the validity of personas remains. It may be possible to verify the quality of
the empirical-data or the robustness of the methodology to develop them, but we
cannot easily falsify the representativeness of personas. The vision of the system
may be tentative enough that what may have been valid working assumptions
at the beginning of the persona development process may be invalid by the time
the personas are presented to project stakeholders. It is, therefore, useful to
understand how characteristics about personas track back to their assumptions,
and why.
2.3 Toulmin’s Model of Argumentation
Codifying the rationale underpinning assumption personas guides analysis and
decision making, but the rationale capture problem, characterised by the reluc-
tance of those involved in design activities to record their rationale, cannot be
ignored [3]. Although the Design Rationale community has proposed several
different approaches for building rationale capture into the design process, the
Security and Requirements Engineering community has taken a recent interest
in capturing rationale using the vehicle of informal argumentation. These ap-
proaches are founded on Toulmin’s Argumentation Model: a logical structure
for reasoning about the validity of arguments [15], the elements of which are
defined in table 1 .
Table 1. Elements of Toulmin’s Argumentation Model
Element Description
Claim A proposition representing a claim being made in an argument.
Grounds One or more propositions acting as evidence justifying the Claim.
Warrant One or more rules of inference describing how the Grounds contribute
to the Claim.
Backing The knowledge establishing the Grounds for believing the Warrant.
Modal Qualifier A phrase qualifying the degree of certainty in the argument for the
Claim.
Rebuttal One or more propositions challenging the validity of the Claim.
Alexander & Beus-Dukic describe a number of simple rationale models for
Requirements Engineering based on this structure [2]. From a security stand-
point, Haley et al. have proposed using Toulmin’s model to support arguments
for security requirements [11]. In their approach, an argument for a system satis-
fying its security requirements is presented for analysis. Each proposition within
this argument is treated as a Claim, and argued accordingly. Rebuttals represent
Trust Assumptions; these can be countered as part of another security argument,
or examined in subsequent threat modelling activities.
3 Approach
We have chosen to embrace, rather than ignore, the contribution assumptions
make to assumption persona design. We propose a novel approach to structuring
the contribution of assumptions to persona specifications, and integrating this
conceptual structure into an existing approach for secure systems design.
3.1 Developing assumption personas
Personas are usually represented as a narrative describing the behaviour of an
archetypical user. Authoring these narratives remains a creative exercise, but
we propose augmenting these by structuring the assumption data contributing
to them. We have aligned this structure to Toulmin’s Model of Argumentation,
introduced in section 2.3. Adopting this approach allows us to treat assumptions
directly contributing to part of the narrative as a Claim. The task of justifying
this Claim both strengthens the foundations of the persona, and guides subse-
quent elicitation and analysis activities. These Claims are represented concep-
tually using one of more Characteristics; these are propositions about a specific
aspect of a persona’s behaviour. Characteristics are categorised according to
one of the behavioural variable types defined by IRIS personas; these are based
on the behavioural variable types proposed by Cooper [7]: activities, attitudes,
aptitudes, motivations, and skills. Also associated with a Characteristic is a
Fig. 1. Conceptual model of assumption persona data (left), and Toulin model visual-
isation based on an individual characteristic (right)
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qualifying phrase representing the strength of belief in the Characteristic; this
qualifying phrase aligns with the Modal Qualifier in Toulmin’s model.
Persona Characteristics originate from one of two sources. The first source is
some form of Artifact: a document related to the problem domain or the system
being specified, such as a specification, or a transcript from an interview or de-
sign workshop. The second is a design Concept: an instance of an object defined
within the work-in-progress IRIS analysis, such as a description for an asset,
a goal or requirement, or even another persona. Because an individual source
may give rise to multiple Characteristics of the same or different behavioural
categories, a Reference is associated with a given source and Characteristic. The
contents of a Reference will depend on the source type. In the case of an Arti-
fact, a reference contains information tying an attributable piece of information
or comment to a source document or verbal comment, e.g. page number, docu-
ment version, or person. In the case of a Concept, a Reference contains the name
and type of the contributing concept. In both cases, the Reference will contain
as much textual attribution information as necessary to justify the persona’s
Characteristic. The name of the Reference object is a synoptic proposition of
this attribution information. With regards to Toulmin’s model, References align
to either Grounds, Warrants, or Rebuttals. Where a Reference represents a War-
rant, the corresponding Artifact or Concept acts as the Warrant’s Backing.
The meta-model in figure 1 (left) summarises these concepts and their re-
lationships. The stereotypes adjacent to each class represent the corresponding
concept name from Toulmin’s model.
3.2 Applying and refining the assumption personas
Before assumption personas are used, they are presented to a workshop or focus
group containing representative system stakeholders. Following this workshop,
the remaining steps of the process are carried out in the context of smaller
design sessions, as described by [10]. These sessions entail requirements and risk
analysis activities, where, rather than referring to users, personas are used in
their place. In both the workshop and design sessions, new assumptions about
personas may be identified, or existing assumptions challenged. Armed with
the proposed meta-model, tool-support can be developed to elicit the structural
elements of the assumption persona argumentation model. Aside from guiding
and structuring the elicitation of assumption data, the structured argument of
Characteristics can be cross-checked with the persona narrative. If it becomes
difficult to write a believable narrative based on the Characteristics identified,
then these need to be re-evaluated.
We modified the CAIRIS tool introduced in section 2.2 to illustrate how tool-
support can take advantage of this approach. As well as allowing Characteristics
associated with a persona to be quickly reviewed against the narrative, we found
that Characteristics could be quickly created or modified when assumptions are
introduced or challenged during design sessions. Structuring the data according
to the meta-model also facilitates the automatic generation of visual Toulmin
models for persona Characteristics. An example of such a model for a specific
Characteristic is provided in figure 1 (right).
Unsubstantiated Claims and Rebuttals are also an additional source of risk
analysis information. In the case of the latter, obstacles – conditions represent-
ing undesired behaviour preventing an associated goal from being achieved [12]
– can be elicited from these, and its placement guided by the related Charac-
teristic negated by the Rebuttal. This placement guidance is possible because a
persona invariably participates in tasks operationalised by one or more goals or
requirements.
4 Preliminary Results
We used this approach to help specify requirements for an online portal for a
medical research project. The nature of this project was such that eliciting em-
pirical data from representative users during the study was impossible. During
the course of the project, an assumption persona – Alex – was developed to em-
body the assumptions held by the project team about the researchers expected
to use the portal. The assumptions underpinning this persona were initially
derived from a high-level requirements specification document developed by a
different team within the same project; as such, Alex represented the assump-
tions that team had made about the expected user population. After developing
this persona, a half-day workshop was held with the complete project team to
agree the scope for a subsequent requirements and risk analysis of the portal.
During this workshop, Alex was presented to the team. The team both agreed
and disagreed with the characteristics of Alex. Where there was disagreement,
the structured nature of the assumption data was used to track the questionable
characteristic to its originating source, which was discussed in more detail within
the team. Following the workshop, a number of new assumptions were elicited,
which formed the basis of new characteristics about Alex.
After the workshop, three 2-hour design sessions were held with team mem-
bers to carry out requirements and risk analysis relating to two specific tasks
carried out by Alex. As part of this analysis, scenarios were developed describ-
ing how Alex would carry out these tasks with the aid of the portal. During
these sessions, Alex’s characteristics evolved; by the end of the 3rd session, 23
different Characteristics about Alex had been captured. Some of these were mod-
ifications to assumptions captured in the initial stages of persona development,
but several were derived from assumptions which surfaced while eliciting other
concepts, such as tasks and goals. In all cases, these characteristics were justified
by Grounds, and in many cases, a Warrant and Backing were also elicited.
Haley & Nuseibeh [13] observed that experts provide essential domain knowl-
edge about the subtleties of threats, but non-experts ask journalist questions
challenging implicit assumptions assumed by the domain expert. Our prelimi-
nary results during the design sessions concur with this observation. When the
tasks carried out by one of the personas was modelled during one session, one
non-expert participant raised pertinent points about implicit assumptions in the
task description; these were not accounted for by the personas, and led to the
rebuttal of one Characteristic.
Although identifying Grounds for Characteristics was found to be straightfor-
ward, identifying Warrants provided to be more difficult. In particular, we found
that, prior to their initial validation, many of the Characteristics were based ex-
clusively on Grounds, rather than Warrants as well. As such, value judgements
about the source data and the context were directly reflected in these Charac-
teristics. Although the initial workshop surfaced a number of these issues, it was
usually not until the personas were directly used to model tasks in design ses-
sions that many invalid Characteristics were identified. Applying the personas
within a specific context did, however, help identify missing inferential data, or
guide the refactoring of the argumentation structure for affected Characteristics.
5 Conclusion
Personas are a mainstay in User-Centered Design, yet there is a dearth of guid-
ance on how to build and refine these from assumptions, as opposed to empirical
data. We believe this guidance, and corresponding tool-support, may contribute
to a wider adoption of personas in secure software engineering, and a better
understanding of how to use these in a secure software engineering context. This
paper makes three contributions towards these ends. First, we have presented a
model for structuring the assumptions contributing to personas; to help guide
subsequent analysis, this model has been aligned these with Toulmin’s Model of
Argumentation. Second, we have illustrated how tool support reifies this struc-
tured model, and guides subsequent risk analysis. Finally, we have reported some
of the preliminary results validating our approach in a recent case study. A more
detailed report of this study will appear as a future publication.
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